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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
Nos. 02-4381/4554
            
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Appellee
v.
JAMES MELTON a/k/a Jay-Mo, a/k/a JOHN MELTON, a/k/a JASON MELTON, a/k/a
DAVID McGHAE
Appellant No. 02-4381
_______
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Appellee
v.
PATRICK STEWART
Appellant No. 02-4554
          
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Nos. 00-cr-00384-07, 00-cr-00384-03)
District Judge: The Honorable Stephen M. Orlofsky
              
2Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
Date: May 13, 2005
Before: SLOVITER, FISHER and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Filed: May 13, 2005)
         
 OPINION OF THE COURT
         
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
Appellants James Melton and Patrick Stewart (collectively “defendants”) appeal
their convictions and sentences for, inter alia, conspiracy to distribute and possession with
intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.
Defendants were members of a large-scale drug trafficking organization headed by Earl
Wynn. They were tried together and a jury returned a guilty verdict. The District Court
sentenced Melton to concurrent terms of 480 months and 48 months and Stewart to
concurrent terms of 121 months and 48 months. The defendants’ appeals were
consolidated by an order of this Court. 
We must decide whether: (1) the District Court erred in accepting the wiretap
affidavit; (2) the District Court exceeded the permissible bounds of discretion in
admitting evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence; (3) the
District Court exceeded the permissible bounds of discretion by not declaring a mistrial;
(4) there was sufficient evidence to support the defendants’ convictions; and (5) the
3District Court erred in sentencing the defendants. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We will affirm the conviction, vacate the sentences and remand for re-
sentencing in accordance with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.—, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). 
I.
Because we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the facts, procedural
history and contentions presented, we will not recite them except as necessary to the
discussion.
II.
Melton contends that the wiretap evidence should be suppressed because the
government’s affidavit for authorization failed to establish the necessity for the wiretap.
“We review de novo the question of whether a full and complete statement of necessity
for a wiretap was made in the application. Once it is determined that the statement was
made, we will review the court’s determination of necessity for an abuse of discretion.”
United States v. Phillips, 959 F.2d 1187, 1189 (3d Cir. 1992). 
In order to use a wiretap, the government must submit an application in writing
that states, inter alia, that “whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried
and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too
dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2000). A judge must then make a similar
determination. § 2518(3)(c). These provisions were designed to assure that wiretapping is
not employed when traditional investigative techniques would be sufficient. United States
4v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n. 12 (1974). We have explained that “[i]t is sufficient that
the government show that other techniques are impractical under the circumstances and
that it would be unreasonable to require pursuit of those avenues of investigation.” United
States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 849 (3d Cir. 1976).  
Here, the government’s affidavit detailed how normal investigative procedures had
been tried and were unlikely to succeed again. For example, the affidavit stated that: (1)
physical surveillance had to be used sparingly because the drug traffickers could easily
identify law enforcement officers; (2) video surveillance had been detected and
vandalized; (3) Earl Wynn was adept at counter-surveillance; (4) pen registers provided
limited information; and (5) the confidential source expressed safety concerns. 
Accordingly, the information provided by the government’s affidavit was more than
sufficient to demonstrate the need for a wiretap under the applicable case law.
III.
Melton contends also that the District Court exceeded the permissible bounds of
discretion in admitting evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b). We review a district court’s
decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion, which “may be reversed only when
clearly contrary to reason and not justified by the evidence.” United States v. Butch, 256
F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). Rule 404(b) prohibits the use of
evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” to prove the character of a person. In Butch,
we said:
5The “threshold inquiry a court must make before admitting similar acts
evidence under Rule 404(b) is whether that evidence is probative of a
material issue other than character.” This Court recently set out a
four-factor standard governing the admissibility of evidence pursuant to
Rule 404(b), which requires: (1) a proper evidentiary purpose; (2) relevance
under Rule 402; (3) a weighing of the probative value of the evidence
against its prejudicial effect under Rule 403; and (4) a limiting instruction
concerning the purpose for which the evidence may be used. 
Id. at 175 (internal citations omitted). 
Here, the District Court noted that the testimony of a co-conspirator could be
considered relevant to provide necessary background information, to show an ongoing
relationship between Melton and his co-conspirators and to help the jury understand the
co-conspirator’s role in the scheme. The court also concluded that the probative value of
the evidence outweighed the prejudicial value and gave the jury limiting instructions.
Accordingly, it did not exceed the permissible bounds of discretion. 
IV.
Further, Melton argues that the District Court erred in not declaring a mistrial. In
its case-in-chief, the government may not adduce testimony of a defendant’s
imprisonment. United States v. Gray, 468 F.2d 257, 260 (3d Cir. 1972). We review a
district court’s denial of a mistrial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d
1281, 1285-1286 (3d Cir. 1993). 
Melton seizes upon two brief and ambiguous remarks to show that the government
presented evidence that he was imprisoned. As to the first statement, Melton’s counsel
6admitted that it was not sufficient to ask for a mistrial because the witness’s statement
was ambiguous. The second statement, ambiguous at best, was stricken from the record.
We have held that courts must “normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to
disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it . . . . ” United States v.
Fisher, 10 F.3d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the District Court did not exceed
the permissible bounds of discretion in denying a mistrial.
V.
Both defendants raise sufficiency of the evidence questions. We exercise plenary
review over challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, United States v. Taftsiou, 144
F.3d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 1998), to determine whether the trial evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the government, would allow a rational trier of fact to convict,
United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 2001).
Wynn’s testimony was sufficient to establish guilt on all counts and his statements
were corroborated by other witnesses. Both defendants attack Wynn’s credibility and
Stewart contends that Wynn “admitted” lying to the jury. It is not our role to assess the
credibility of witnesses. United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1202-1203 n. 3 (3d Cir.
1994). Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence for the jury’s verdict. 
VI. 
Both defendants challenge their sentences. Having concluded that the sentencing
issues raised here are best determined by the District Court in the first instance, we will
7vacate the sentence and remand for re-sentencing in accordance with United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S.—, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). 
* * * * * 
We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties and conclude that
no further discussion is necessary. 
The judgment of the District Court relating to the defendants’ convictions will be
affirmed. We will vacate the sentences and remand for re-sentencing in accordance with
Booker. 
